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Army IG on the web
https://ig.army.mil
Preface

Dear Army Leaders and Inspectors General–

The past fiscal year has seen the Army – and America – bounce back from the Coronavirus pandemic and face new challenges. New and existing armed conflicts throughout the world reinforce our need to focus on warfighting, building ready units, strengthening our profession of arms, and continually transforming ourselves into the Army of 2030.

Throughout FY23, we continued to execute a five-year strategy to modernize the Army Inspector General System to better meet the needs of our Army. A revision of Army Regulation (AR) 1-201 (Army Inspection Policy) was released shortly after the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 23 in order to fortify and reinvigorate the Organizational Inspection Program (OIP). Also, in concert with several Army staff sections, the Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) led the way in developing a new Army policy for reporting and tracking allegations of prohibited activities – a critical tool in combating extremist and criminal gang activity within our ranks.

DAIG also coordinated with the Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) Academy, the U.S. Army Military Police School, and the Office of the Judge Advocate General to train Army personnel on Sexual Harassment investigations. Our Inspections teams are conducting an aggressive inspection plan for FY24-25, focused on the priorities of the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff, Army. Finally, DAIG held its first in-person Worldwide IG Conference since 2019.

I remain incredibly proud of all Army IGs and the high level of expertise they display every day while executing the four inspector general functions – Inspections, Assistance, Investigations, and Teaching and Training. The IG System investments and improvements described above, along with our professional force of experienced inspectors general, are a valuable enabler that allows commanders to focus on what is most important, our people.

– LTG Donna W. Martin, The 67th Inspector General
Introduction

Report Scope

This report discusses the activities of Army IGs in FY23, 1 October 2022 to 30 September 2023. It summarizes the inspection activities of the Department of the DAIG, examines IG System requests for information or assistance, and analyzes the prevalence of alleged and investigated misconduct. The discussion of misconduct is divided into two sections. The first section discusses trend analysis from FY21-23 for senior officials, while the second section discusses trend analysis from FY21-23 for non-senior officials, including brigade and battalion commanders, command sergeants major/sergeants major, and Department of the Army (DA) Civilians.

The scope of misconduct encompasses allegations against subjects from all Army Components (Active Component (AC), Reserve Component (RC), and Appropriated-Fund Army Civilians) that have resulted in investigations on topics deemed IG appropriate. The data originates from authoritative Army IG databases. Because of jurisdictional overlap, the data in this report are based on investigations conducted by Army IGs or referred to commanders by Army IGs and may not contain findings from investigations of Army subjects conducted by Department of Defense (DOD) IGs or Joint IGs.

The Army Inspector General System

The IG system is unique in both its scope and implementation. The Inspector General (TIG) is the Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) proponent for the IG System and serves as the Commander, U.S. Army Inspector General Agency (USAIGA). Field IGs work only for the commander or director (also referred to as the Directing Authority) of their assigned unit or organization.

Thus, a field IG is responsible to his or her commander, but responsive to TIG and the needs of the Secretary of the Army (SA) and the Chief of Staff, Army (CSA). The IG system is designed to complement and support command channels, while providing Army senior leaders visibility on systemic issues throughout the force, further allowing them to see and address critical Army-wide issues that could affect Army readiness.

Role of The Inspector General

TIG is responsible to the SA and responsive to the CSA.

TIG inquires into, and periodically reports on, the discipline, efficiency, economy, morale, training, and readiness of the Army to the SA and the CSA, in accordance with Title 10, Section 7020, United

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1 The term DAIG is used when referring to both the Office of the Inspector General (OTIG) and the U.S. Army Inspector General Agency (USAIGA) as one entity. See Army Regulation (AR) 20-1 (Inspector General Activities), 23 March 2020.
2 AR 20-1 lists topics that are not appropriate for IG action, or for which IGs have a limited or infrequent role.
3 USAIGA is the field operating agency of the Office of the Inspector General (OTIG). TIG’s resources are assigned to USAIGA.
4 AR 20-1.
States Code. Additionally, TIG proposes programs of inspection to the SA and CSA and recommends additional inspections and investigations as appropriate.

As the functional and personnel proponent for the IG system, TIG:

- Develops and publishes policy and doctrine for the IG System;
- Oversees the Army IG inspection program;
- Oversees Army IG senior official investigations and special investigations;
- Trains IGs and assistant IGs by overseeing the U.S. Army Inspector General School; and,
- Approves or disapproves nominations of Army officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) to serve as Army IGs.

Role of Army Inspectors General

All IGs are confidential advisers to, and fact-finders for, their commander. Whenever possible, IGs work through and within the chain of command to maintain their viability, effectiveness, and relevancy. However, while an IG is always responsible to his or her commander, he or she must maintain a clear distinction between his or her role as an extension of the commander, and his or her sworn duty to serve as a fair, impartial, and objective fact-finder and problem solver. To do this, IGs must remain sufficiently independent of their commanders so that those individuals requesting IG assistance will continue to do so—even when the complainant believes the command or commander may be part of the problem. Commanders must understand this distinction for their IGs to be effective.

Who May File Army IG Requests for assistance?

Anyone—including Service members, DOD and DA Civilians, Family members, retirees and their dependents, contract employees, and members of the general public—may submit a request for information or assistance, or allegation, to any Army IG concerning a matter of Army interest, though not all matters are appropriate for IG action (see below). It is generally best for the person needing assistance or person who witnessed alleged wrongdoing to speak to an IG.

What Type of Matters Are IG Appropriate?

The Army IG is an appropriate channel to report problems when the subject is an Army program or person; however, not all matters are appropriate for IG involvement. If you are not sure that your concern is appropriate for IG action, contact your local IG office for guidance. The local IG will refer a complaint or allegation to another authority if it is not an IG-appropriate matter. An IG may also dismiss a complaint if the complainant has not filed it in a timely manner.

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5 AR 20-1.
6 AR 20-1.
7 Per AR 20-1, para. 6-2a., IGs will not accept anonymous or third-party allegations of statutory whistleblower reprisal. The affected individual must want the IG to investigate the allegation and be willing to cooperate.
8 Per AR 20-1, para. 6-1e., an IG is not required to look into an issue if the complainant has failed to present the matter within 1 year of learning of the alleged problem or wrongdoing or if more than 3 years have elapsed since the date of the problem or wrongdoing.
How and Where Do I File a Request For Assistance, or an Allegation?

While IGs generally encourage individuals to discuss any issues, allegations, or requests for assistance with their chain of command, there is no requirement for individuals to do so before contacting an IG. If an individual decides to use the IG system to resolve an issue, they should contact a local IG office (to find the closest local IG office, please visit https://ig.army.mil/REQUEST-IG-ACTION/Find-an-Army-IG/). A local IG office will provide fastest possible response to the issue.

The next preferred method is to submit a request or allegation online at https://ig.army.mil/REQUEST-IG-ACTION/Request-Army-IG-Action/ (fill out the online form; do not use this method for any issue involving classified information). Alternatively, the Army IG Assistance Division can be reached via email at USARMYDAIGassistance@army.mil.

Please note that regardless of where or how an individual files a request or allegation, it will often be referred to the individual’s local IG office for action.

The Army IG Hotline can be reached toll-free at 1-800-424-9098, commercial at 703-604-8799, or by DSN at 664-8799. Press option 1, option 1, to reach the Army IG.

The Army National Guard IG Hotline is at 703-607-2539, and the Army Reserve IG Hotline is at 855-560-3805.
Army IG Activities in FY23

Inspecting Army Organizations

Army Inspections

TIG provides broad policy guidance for the conduct of the OIP, execution of command inspections (for example, initial command inspections and subsequent command inspections), and staff inspections. TIG also provides detailed instructions regarding the execution of IG inspections. Even though IGs execute or assist with inspections at all levels of the Army from the company/troop/battery level to Army Commands (ACOMs), a detailed discussion of these inspections is beyond the scope of this report. Instead, this report will briefly discuss several inspections conducted or completed by DAIG during FY23 at the direction of senior Army leaders.

DAIG Systemic Inspections Executed and Completed in FY23

The SA, CSA, or Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) direct DAIG systemic inspections. These inspections assess the health of an entire Army system and make recommendations on how this system can functionally improve in the future.* In FY23, the DAIG Inspection Directorate conducted, or are currently completing, the following inspections:

Special Inspection of Army Arms, Ammunition & Explosives

On 19 August 2022, the SA directed a special inspection of the Army's accountability and physical security of Arms, Ammunition & Explosives (AA&E). DAIG Inspectors, augmented by four subject matter experts from Army National Guard Bureau (NGB), U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), the Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG) and Army Materiel Command (AMC), conducted the inspection. The team interviewed 126 personnel at 5 locations from November 2022 to February 2023.

Overall, the inspection team noted that organizations have measures in place to safeguard and account for (AA&E). The inspection team identified 9 findings (2 positive notes, 2 deficiencies, and 5 observations), and made 8 recommendations. (Key findings on next page)

* Common Access Card (CAC) holders who would like to view copies of DAIG inspection reports approved for release by The Inspector General can access them at the Army Publishing Directorate website: https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/PogProponent.aspx.
Special Inspection of Army Equal Opportunity/Equal Employment Opportunity Training

On 6 September 2022, the SA directed a special inspection of equal opportunity training at every echelon. DAIG Inspectors augmented by five subject matter experts from NGB, FORSCOM, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) conducted the inspection. The team interviewed 169 personnel, sensed 705 personnel, and reviewed 277 documents at 7 locations from April to May 2023.

Overall, the team found that Army policy supports Military Equal Opportunity (MEO)/Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) training, but requires additional clarification on MEO training topics, and the responsibilities of the Equal Opportunity Advisor (EOA) and Equal Opportunity Leader (EOL). In terms of command presence and conduct of training, it was determined that commanders were conducting annual MEO and EEO training.

It was also determined that HQDA needs to evaluate and improve MEO and EEO resourcing (personnel and funding) to ensure all components can comply with mandates. The inspection team identified 12 findings (5 positive notes, 4 deficiencies, and 3 observations) and made 8 recommendations.
Special Inspection of Army Sexual Harassment Assault and Response Program (SHARP) Training

On 23 March 2023, the SA directed a special inspection of SHARP Training. DAIG Inspectors augmented by one subject matter expert from Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS), G–9, Directorate of Prevention, Resilience and Readiness (DPRR) (formerly DCS, G–1 Army Resilience Directorate) conducted the inspection. The team interviewed 141 personnel, sensed 288 NCOs, surveyed 984 specialists and privates, and reviewed 187 documents at 8 locations from May to June 2023.

Overall, the team confirmed that training was overwhelmingly being conducted IAW standards and identified 11 findings (6 positive notes, 1 deficiency, and 4 observations) and made 8 recommendations. (Key findings on next page)
**SHARP Training Inspection Good News Findings**

- All command teams were directly involved in the planning, directing, and execution of annual SHARP training; and Soldiers confirmed this participation.
- All leaders and most Soldiers confirmed units conducted training face-to-face using several interactive training methods in small-to-medium-sized group settings.
- Units found creative ways to train (e.g., physical activities) and support the SHARP Program outside of the annual training requirement. By creatively adding SHARP training to physical activities and endorsing ambassador programs, units were successfully reinforcing the SHARP Program to resonate more with Soldiers and increase their engagement.
- Commands also affirmed they would feel comfortable delivering annual SHARP training if provided adequate preparation time and materials.
- Training conducted at the SHARP training facilities led to increased engagement and awareness of the SHARP Program among Soldiers and leaders. These facilities imitate real-life environments that provide an immersive role-playing experience to teach enhanced prevention and intervention techniques.
- Battalion and higher commanders published command policy memorandums IAW relevant Army Regulations, and the majority incorporated unit-level annual SHARP training guidance.

**SHARP Training Inspection Key Challenges**

- Few leaders (officers and NCOs) led annual SHARP training. Leaders demonstrated a lack of regulatory guidance awareness and confusion defining the term “unit leaders.” This lack of awareness contributed to the misperception that only certified SHARP professionals could lead annual SHARP training.
- Many leaders wanted tailored training that addressed their respective roles and responsibilities; however, they were not familiar with the additional training resources available from the SHARP Academy’s Training Support package that addresses these needs.

**Special Inspection of Army Secure Environment Contracting (SEC)**

The SA directed a special inspection of the Army Contracting Command’s Secure Environment Contracting Centers (SECC) in the FY23-24 Inspection Plan. DAIG Inspectors augmented by subject matter experts from Army Contracting Command (ACC); Army Special Program Directorate (ASPD); and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Procurement)(DASA-(P)) conducted the inspection.

The team conducted interviews and group sensing sessions with 73 Army civilians and military personnel including senior contracting officials, division chiefs, contracting officers, and contracting specialists within ACC. Over the course of the inspection, the inspection team reviewed 499 documents, conducted 73 interviews, and reviewed 30 contracts. The inspection team conducted site visits at five Continental United States locations from April to August 2023.

Overall, the inspection showed, with minor exceptions, that the ODASA(P) and ACC provide consistent and valid guidance for SEC procedures to procure and safeguard research and development technologies and provide adequate program protection. However, the Army does not have an established automated contract system or information repositories needed for contracts above Controlled Unclassified information (CUI). The inspection team identified 5 findings (1 deficiency and 4 observations) and made 10 recommendations.
SEC Inspection Good News Findings

- With minor exceptions, that the ODASA(P) and ACC provide consistent and valid guidance for SEC procedures to procure and safeguard research and development technologies and provide adequate program protection.
- Lack of automated contract writing and processing systems within the SEC system creates unnecessary security and financial risks.

SEC Inspection Key Challenges

- The Army does not have an established automated contract system or information repositories needed for contracts above CUI.
- Attrition of SEC personnel and substantial lag time between submission and granting of security clearances is causing chronic understaffing and remaining personnel are increasingly unable to accomplish necessary tasks within the SEC system.
- The automated contract writing and processing systems in use for non-SEC contracts provide streamlined workflow, standardized operating procedures, and checks and balances that maximizes the commander’s ability to efficiently expend resources.

DAIG Compliance Inspections FY23

TIG directs DAIG compliance inspections on behalf of the SA and CSA, based on requirements contained in statute, policy, and regulations. These inspections assess a specific Army organization’s adherence to relevant statutes and DOD/Army policy and regulation.

In FY23, DAIG conducted 51 compliance inspections, primarily by the Intelligence Oversight (IO), Technical Inspections (TI), and Cybersecurity (CSI) Divisions. IO conducts intelligence-related inspections in two broad categories: Intelligence Oversight and Sensitive Activities (SAs)/Special Access Programs (SAPs). CSI conducts an annual Federal Information Security Modernization Act evaluation of the Army Cybersecurity Program through data obtained inspecting cybersecurity programs at echelon. TI conducts compliance inspections and evaluations of the Army’s Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Surety and Nuclear Reactor Facility programs.

IG policy generally prohibits discussion of specific findings associated with compliance inspections unless the audience has a need to know.

Cybersecurity Reporting Follow-Up

The purpose of this inspection was to assess compliance with the 13 SA-approved DAIG recommendations/tasks from the FY18 Special Inspection of the Army CSR. DAIG conducted this inspection from January to March 2023. The follow-up inspection determined that U.S. Army stakeholders responsible for making changes to cybersecurity policy and procedures completed 10 of the tasks assigned and the remaining 3 tasks were being actively worked.
Army Assistance Requests

A large part of an IG's job consists of assisting Soldiers, DA Civilians, Family members, and the public. This assistance function is the process of receiving, inquiring into, recording, and responding to complaints or requests for assistance either brought directly to the IG or referred to the IG for action. As shown in Figure 1 below, from FY21-23, the Army IG System registered 139,610 total assistance requests made by Soldiers, Family members, DA Civilian employees, and members of the public.

**Figure 1**

**Total Requests for Information FY21-23**

Since the Army is a standards-based organization, members of the command or community often approach IGs looking for information or clarification on matters related to Army policies, procedures, and standards. As Figure 1 shows, of the 139,610 total requests for assistance between FY21-23, 59,522 (43 percent) were categorized as requests for information.

**Example: Request for Information**

“I have an issue with my military retirement pay. Can you tell me who can assist with my pay issue?”
Assistance Inquiries FY21-23

In addition to providing information, IGs often assist Soldiers, Family Members, DA Civilian employees, and members of the public with assistance inquiries. An assistance inquiry is an informal fact-finding process used to address or respond to a request for help, information, or other issues, but not allegations of impropriety or wrongdoing by a specific individual. If an IG’s assistance inquiry can no longer address the issue, an IG can refer it to a commander for further action. Figure 1 shows that from the beginning of FY21 to the end of FY23, there were 80,088 assistance inquires conducted in the IG system, with 29,346 conducted in FY23 alone. Sometimes these assistance inquiries were simple, and IGs could quickly resolve them. Other times, they required an IG to expend considerable time and resources to assist the complainant.

Example: Request for Assistance

An IG received an assistance request from a Soldier who did not receive a bonus when he enlisted in 2019. The Soldier stated that upon enlisting in the Army, he was to receive a $20,000 bonus, which he never collected. Between his interaction with his chain of command and his request for assistance from separate members of congress, the Soldier’s request was unsuccessful. Through coordination with the U.S. Army Recruiting Command and the U.S. Army Financial Management Command, the IG assisted the Soldier with the required correction of his personnel records and the subsequent submission of the request to the Defense Finance and Accounting Service. Ultimately, the enlistment bonus was paid to the Soldier in full during the follow-up phase of the IG action process.

Assistance Inquiries by Category for FY21-23

The pie chart in Figure 2 identifies the top assistance inquiry categories from FY20 to FY23. As Figure 2 shows, the most prevalent assistance inquiry category dealt with addressing command/leadership issues, which collectively represented 30 percent of the all inquiries.
Common categories of assistance inquiries:

**Command/Leadership Issues:** Primarily involves the leadership of an organization or command’s actions to address Soldier or Family member problems, including issues regarding command policies.

**Personnel Management–Military:** Involves aspects of military personnel administration and management, including but not limited to accessions, awards and decorations, enlistments, evaluations, flagging actions, identification cards, leave and passes, mobilization, personnel records, promotions, and recruiting issues.

**Finance & Accounting:** Involves finance issues such as Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS), Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH), Family Separation Allowance (FSA), Cost of Living Allowance (COLA), Overseas Housing Allowance (OHA), advances of BAH and OHA, and clothing allowance issues. It also includes temporary duty pay issues, enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, and basic pay issues.

**Personal Misconduct:** Involves areas of personal moral, ethical and military standards (such as indebtedness, uniform violations, toxic work environment, and Absent Without Official Leave). Most personal misconduct issues presented to IGs are handled via command inquiries and investigative inquiries versus assistance inquiries. However, sometimes a complainant’s perceptions of personal misconduct do not rise to the level of being true allegations and are thus resolved with an IG assistance inquiry.

**Health Care:** Covers all aspects of medical care from providers to patients. This category includes a broad scope of issues or allegations involving the quality of medical care at Army treatment facilities and non-Army medical facilities, medical appointments, and overall medical staff attitude and courtesy. It also covers military medical education issues and guidelines for veterinary, environmental, food services, and other special programs. The most common health care related assistance requests in FY 21-23 were related to Army Medical Evaluation Boards.
Misconduct

Senior Official Misconduct Trends FY21-23

Senior Officials

In this report, the term ‘senior official’ refers to general officers (AC and RC), colonels serving as Professors, United States Military Academy (PUSMAs), colonels selected for promotion to brigadier general, retired general officers, and current or former DA Civilian employees of the Senior Executive Service (SES) or equal positions, to include comparable political appointees. All allegations of senior official impropriety or misconduct (including criminal allegations) must be forwarded to DAIG within 2 working days. Only investigative personnel assigned to DAIG will conduct IG senior official investigations.

Caution: Requirement to Report Allegations Against Senior Officials

IAW AR 20-1, commanders or IGs must forward directly to DAIG’s Investigations Division through IG channels any and all allegations of impropriety or misconduct (including criminal allegations) against senior officials within 2 working days of receipt. This requirement is also found in AR 15-6 (Procedures for Administrative Investigations and Boards of Officers).

Senior Official Visibility

The probability of having an allegation lodged against an individual in any given year changes significantly according to the individual’s rank. As shown in Figure 3 (next page), officers in the rank of colonel and above, sergeants major, and Civilians in the SES have a greater probability of having an allegation lodged against them in a given year (green data points and line). Thus, Figure 3 indicates senior officials are much more likely to face allegations of misconduct than the non-senior official population.

The reasons that senior officials are more likely to receive an allegation of misconduct than non-senior ranks can be summarized as follows:

1. All senior official allegations must be forwarded to DAIG within 2 working days (see above) and all allegations are examined by DAIG investigators, even if the senior official allegation does not meet the criteria for a valid IG allegation.
2. Senior officials do not just execute established policy, but must also formulate and/or interpret complex policies within their units/organizations.
3. Senior officials are the approval authority for many potently contentious administrative and adverse administrative actions, and;

Allegation: A statement or assertion of wrongdoing by an individual, formulated by an IG. An allegation normally contains four essential elements: (1) who (named individual), (2) improperly, (3) did or failed to do something, (4) in violation of an established standard. The IG refines allegations based on evidence gathered during the course of an investigation. (Note: A single “investigation” or “case” may have multiple allegations associated with it. For the purpose of this report, we will not cite “case” statistics; rather, we will focus on statistics regarding individual types of allegations.)
4. Senior officials and command sergeants major are at the apex of large organizations consisting of thousands of Soldiers and/or employees are thus under far more scrutiny than other non-senior officials.

The bottom line is that senior officials must understand this environment, because once they enter the ‘High Visibility Zone,’ they are more likely be the subject of an allegation(s).
Overall Senior Official Misconduct FY21-23

Between FY21 and FY23, DAIG’s Investigations Division received 1,737 separate complaints against Army senior officials, containing a total of 2,355 allegations of misconduct against 804* separate senior official subjects.

As Figure 4 (next page) shows, the overall number of complaints against Army senior officials and the allegations within those complaints dropped by 12 percent and 13 percent, respectively, from FY21 to FY22, then remained consistent through FY23. In FY21, DAIG received 627 individual complaints, containing 857 allegations against 412 different Army senior officials. In FY22 those numbers dropped to 550 complaints with 744 allegations against 387 Army senior officials, followed in FY 23 by 560 complaints with 754 allegations against 383 SOs.

Figure 5 (next page) shows the senior official allegations DAIG substantiated during the reporting period. The DAIG Investigations Division substantiated 77 allegations of misconduct against 33 senior officials from FY 21-23. This included 15 allegations substantiated against 5 senior officials in FY21, 4 allegations substantiated against 4 SOs in FY22, and 58 allegations substantiated against 24 senior officials in FY23.

The noteworthy jump in FY23 is attributed to just a few significant and uncommon case closures during the year. The Investigations Division was able to close 6 cases covering a broad span of time and actions which resulted in 27 substantiated allegations against just 2 senior officials in 1 organization. They also closed 1 case which resulted in 9 substantiated allegations against 4 senior officials. Finally, there were 3 additional cases which resulted in 7 substantiated allegations against 3 senior officials, each of whom had more than 1 substantiated allegation.

*804 is the total number of separate Army Senior officials against whom complaints were made during the three-year FY 21-23 reporting period. This controls for separate complaints made against the same SOs over the course of the reporting period.
Senior Official Misconduct by Allegation Type FY21-23

Figure 6 and Figure 7 (next page) highlight the difference between what complainants believe constitutes senior official misconduct (Perception) and what actually is determined to be senior leader misconduct (Reality).

As noted above, DAIG received 1,737 separate senior official complaints during FY21-23. During the same period, we closed nearly 1,700 individual cases containing more than 2,200 separate allegations. As indicated in Figure 6, within those complaints closed and allegations addressed during this period, matters within the Command and Leadership category made up the lion’s share, 50 percent, of complainants’ perception of what they believe is wrong.

This category includes 5 of the top 10 specific allegations, including Command and Leadership Failures—Other (non-specific), 20 percent; Failure to Take Appropriate Action, 15 percent; Failure to Obey an Order or Regulation, 6 percent; Counterproductive Leadership, 6 percent; and Failure to Treat Individuals with Dignity and Respect, 3 percent.

Claims of Statutory Reprisal against a Service Member (Title 10 US Code § 1034) is third overall at 8 percent of all complaints, followed by alleged Improper Personnel Actions (non-specific) at 4 percent; Civilian EEO complaints at 3 percent; and Military EO complaints based on race at 2 percent or without a specific EO category, also at 2 percent, rounding out the top 10 allegations. The FY21-23 top five senior official allegations (Perception) are generally consistent over long-term historical trends for senior official complaints, with only minor shifts in percentages or ranking, year over year.

During this reporting period, DAIG substantiated 77 specific allegations against Army senior officials. As illustrated in Figure 7 below, the most substantiated allegations (Reality) against senior officials are Counterproductive Leadership at 17 percent (13 allegations), followed by Failure to Obey an Order or Regulation, Improper Personnel Actions (Assignments and Reassignments) and Improper Personnel Actions (non-specific) at 6 percent (5 allegations) each. Finally, rounding out the top 10 substantiated allegations with 5 percent (4 allegations) each, are Failure to Treat Individuals with Dignity & Respect, Failure to Display Exemplary Conduct, Personal Misconduct, Ethical Misconduct, and Statutory Reprisal, and Failure to Promote a Positive Command Climate at 4 percent (3 allegations).

DAIG uses 97 distinct allegation codes to address and categorize Army senior official misconduct.
complaints. While just the top 10 most common specific allegations accounted for nearly 1,600 separate allegations of senior official misconduct and impropriety (Perception) closed by DAIG during FY21-23, only 77 of all allegations ultimately resulted in a substantiation during the same period. What this means, from the larger Army perspective, is that the Army’s senior officials and their teams are doing the right things for our Soldiers, Families and Civilians, our Army, and our Nation.

Of particular note is the fact that only two of the top five most common allegations made remain in the top five substantiated allegations – Counterproductive Leadership and Failure to Obey an Order or Regulation. This highlights the fact that complainants often believe they are witnessing misconduct when in fact they are not, and may not have the complete picture of what has happened.

Conversely, sometimes when an IG looks into an allegation, they determine that the initially reported allegation was not supported by the evidence, but DAIG may find misconduct of a different type during an investigation of the reported matter.

**Example: Substantiated Senior Official Allegation**

A general officer removed a Soldier from his duty position and issued him a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand (GOMOR). The General Officer cited a protected communication the Soldier made to an investigating officer as one reason for the GOMOR. The investigating officer found that while the Soldier committed other violations that may have warranted the GOMOR, the inclusion of the protected communication in the GOMOR clearly linked the protected communication to an adverse personnel action, and therefore constituted reprisal in accordance with Title 10, U.S.C. 1034 (Military Whistleblower Protection Act) and DODD 7050.06 (Military Whistleblower Protection). DODIG concurred with the substantiated finding of whistleblower reprisal.
Senior Official Misconduct by Military Component FY21-23

Figure 8 and Figure 9 (below) are sorted by the percentage of the top 10 specific allegations made or substantiated against all Army senior officials for FY21 to FY23 (left most columns). The right-hand columns then indicate the top five allegations made or substantiated against Active Duty, ARNG, USAR, and SES senior officials, respectively.

As Figure 8 shows, during FY 21-23, the top 5 specific senior official allegations received by DAIG were generally consistent for all three COMPOS and the SES populations.

Figure 9 shows that during FY 21-23, Counterproductive Leadership was the most prevalent substantiated allegation among all Army SOs, overall. However, unlike the initial allegations received in Figure 8, the top substantiated allegations vary across the three COMPOS and the SES populations.

### Sorted by ALL ARMY Allegations Substantiated by DAIG’s Investigations Division

#### Figure 8

**PERCEPTION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All ARMY % of Total</th>
<th>Top Allegations Substantiated FY21-23*</th>
<th>Active Duty</th>
<th>ARNG</th>
<th>USAR</th>
<th>SES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>Rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>Counterproductive Leadership</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>1T</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>Failure to Obey an Order or Regulation</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>4T</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>Improper Personnel Action (Assignment/Reassignment)</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>2T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>Improper Personnel Action (non-specific)</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>2T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>Failure to Treat Individuals with Dignity &amp; Respect</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>1T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>Failure to Display Exemplary Conduct</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>2T</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>Personal Misconduct - Other</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>2T</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>4T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>Ethical Misconduct - Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>Statutory Reprisal</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Sorted by ALL ARMY Allegations Substantiated by DAIG’s Investigations Division

#### Figure 9

**REALITY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All ARMY % of Total</th>
<th>Top Allegations Substantiated FY21-23*</th>
<th>Active Duty</th>
<th>ARNG</th>
<th>USAR</th>
<th>SES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>Rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.1%</td>
<td>Command/Leadership Issues</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>Failure to Take Appropriate Action</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>Statutory Reprisal</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>Failure to Obey an Order or Regulation</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>Counterproductive Leadership</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>Improper Personnel Action - Other</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>Failure to Treat Individuals with Dignity &amp; Respect</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>EEO Violations (Civilian)</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>2T</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>EO Violations (Military) (Race)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>EO Violations (Military) (non-specific)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>Preferential Treatment</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Sorted by ALL ARMY Allegations Reported to DAIG’s Investigations Division
Non-Senior Official Misconduct Trends FY23

Non-Senior Official Misconduct FY21-23

In this report, the term ‘non-senior official’ refers to non-promotable colonels and below, as well as all GS-15 (or equivalent) DA Civilians and below. Army IGs have two principal procedures for examining allegations of misconduct made against Army non-senior officials. The first is to request the IG’s Directing Authority to authorize an IG investigation, which is a formal fact-finding examination into allegations, issues, or adverse conditions to provide the commander or directing authority with a sound basis for making decisions and taking action. The second is to refer the allegation to the responsible commander and request they inquire into the issue.

Non-Senior Official Misconduct by Allegation Type FY21-23

As illustrated below, Figure 10 and Figure 11/Figure 12 highlight the difference between what complainants think constitutes non-senior official misconduct (Perception) and what actually is non-senior official misconduct (Reality).

As indicated in Figure 10 (below), perceptions of Statutory Reprisal account for 13 percent of total allegations (Perception) made against non-senior officials in FY21-23 followed closely by Counterproductive Leadership at 11 percent. The top five is rounded out by total allegations of Failure to Treat Individuals with Dignity and Respect at 8 percent, Extramarital Sexual Conduct and Failure to Take Appropriate Action at 6 percent each.

Statutory Reprisal is almost always the #1 non-senior allegation in the IG System, because Army IGs are required by statute to investigate whistleblower reprisal. The other four allegations may vary in their year-to-year ranking, but almost always constitute a Top 5 allegation.

Figure 11 (next page) shows the top non-senior official substantiated allegations that resulted...
from IG investigations authorized by the IG’s directing authority or required by statute.\textsuperscript{10} The most substantiated IG investigated allegation against non-senior officials are Statutory Reprisal at 9 percent followed closely by Failure to Treat Individuals with Dignity and Respect, Failure to Obey an Order or Regulation, and Counterproductive Leadership at 8 percent each. Finally, in the fifth position is Failure to Promote a Positive Command Climate at 6 percent of IG investigated substantiated allegations against non-senior officials.

Substantiated allegations that arise from complaints made to IGs but subsequently referred to commanders for investigative action are shown in Figure 12 (above). The most substantiated command referred allegation against non-senior officials is Counterproductive Leadership at 14 percent. This is followed by Failure to Treat Individuals with Dignity and Respect and Extramarital Sexual Contact at 10 percent each. Finally, the top five is closed out by Failure to Obey an Order or Regulation at 7 percent followed closely by Intimate Relationship at 5 percent of command investigated substantiated allegations against non-senior officials.

It is not surprising that Statutory Reprisal is the #1 most substantiated IG invested allegation as Army IGs are required by law to investigate whistleblower reprisal. Also not surprising is the fact that both IG investigations and command investigations share Failure to Obey an Order or Regulation, Failure to Treat Individuals with Dignity and Respect, and Counterproductive Leadership in their top 5 substantiated allegations given the similar populations they respectively investigate.

\textsuperscript{10} In accordance with Section 1034, Title 10, United States Code (10 U.S.C. 1034) and Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 7050.06, if a Soldier makes a complaint that alleges whistleblower reprisal, this allegation must be investigated by a DOD/Service IG.
Example: Statutory Reprisal

A NCO alleged her company commander, first sergeant, and the acting battalion command sergeant major took actions in reprisal for her communication with an inspector general regarding bullying within the company. The complainant alleged the company commander discussed her medical conditions in public, the first sergeant forced the complainant to escort another Soldier to behavioral health, and the acting command sergeant major threatened to demote the complainant after the communication. The IG investigation determined the actions of the company commander and first sergeant were not qualified actions covered under statutory reprisal and removed them as suspects from the investigation. The acting command sergeant major admitted to making a statement in a phone call with another NCO regarding his desire to demote the complainant wherein he wished he “could take her rank.” He also admitted to animus regarding the complainant’s use of the IG prior to allowing him or members of the chain of command to assist with the issue. Unknown to the acting command sergeant major, the NCO complainant overheard the phone conversation. The investigating officer substantiated the acting command sergeant major for whistleblower reprisal against the NCO complainant. DODIG concurred with this finding.

Non-Senior Official Misconduct by Component FY23

Figure 13 and Figure 14 (next page) are sorted by the percentage of allegations of a specific category made against all Army non-senior officials for FY21 to FY23 (left most column). The right hand columns then indicate the top five allegations of a specific category made against Active Army, ARNG and USAR non-senior officials respectfully.

Figure 13 demonstrates that from FY 21-23, Statutory Reprisal and Counterproductive Leadership were the first and second (respectively) most prevalent allegations made against overall Army, Active Duty, ARNG and USAR non-senior officials. Once again, it is not surprising that Statutory Reprisal was the top IG allegation, as Army IGs are required by law to investigate whistleblower reprisal.

In Figure 14 we see that for substantiated allegations arising from IG-led investigations, Statutory Reprisal is the most prevalent for the overall Army, ARNG and USAR, and the second-most prevalent for Active Duty. As indicated above, this is hardly surprising given that Army IGs are usually the only investigators who look into Soldier allegations of whistleblower reprisal.

When it comes to substantiated allegations that arise from command lead investigations, Figure 15 shows that Counterproductive Leadership is in the top position for overall Army, Active Duty and USAR non-senior officials with it ranking in the second position for the ARNG.

Example: Substantiated Non-Senior Official

A Soldier alleged to an IG that their battalion commander exhibited counterproductive leadership behaviors by degrading multiple Soldiers in a public forum. The Soldier said, and many witnesses corroborated, that the battalion commander consistently degraded Soldiers in the unit by making disparaging public comments about specific Soldiers’ individual physical appearance and their ability to pass an Army Combat Fitness Test. A command-appointed investigating officer substantiated the battalion commander not treating his Soldiers with Dignity and Respect.
## NON-SENIOR OFFICIAL TOP ALLEGATIONS FY21-23 BY COMPO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All ARMY % of Total</th>
<th>Top Investigated Allegations*</th>
<th>Active Duty</th>
<th>ARNG</th>
<th>USAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>Rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13%</td>
<td>Statutory Reprisal</td>
<td>12% 1</td>
<td>23% 1</td>
<td>27% 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11%</td>
<td>Counterproductive Leadership</td>
<td>12% 2</td>
<td>6% 2</td>
<td>9% 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8%</td>
<td>Failure to Treat Individuals with Dignity &amp; Respect</td>
<td>9% 3</td>
<td>5% 4</td>
<td>5% 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Extramarital Sexual Conduct</td>
<td>8% 4</td>
<td>4% 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Failure to Take Appropriate Action</td>
<td>6% 5</td>
<td>5% 3</td>
<td>5% 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Abuse of Authority</td>
<td>4% 3</td>
<td>3% 3</td>
<td>6% 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Failure to Obey an Order or Regulation</td>
<td>5% 4</td>
<td>4% 3</td>
<td>3% 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Bullying</td>
<td>4% 4</td>
<td>4% 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Failure to Promote a Positive Command Climate</td>
<td>3% 3</td>
<td>3% 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Fraternization</td>
<td>3% 5</td>
<td>5% 5</td>
<td>2% 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sorted by ALL ARMY Investigated Allegation Percentages

### Figure 13

## NON-SENIOR OFFICIAL TOP SUBSTANTIATED IG-INVESTIGATED ALLEGATIONS FY21-23 BY COMPO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All ARMY % of Total</th>
<th>Top Substantiated Allegations*</th>
<th>Active Duty</th>
<th>ARNG</th>
<th>USAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>Rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9%</td>
<td>Statutory Reprisal</td>
<td>10% 2</td>
<td>19% 1</td>
<td>11% 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8%</td>
<td>Failure to Treat Individuals with Dignity &amp; Respect</td>
<td>10% 1</td>
<td>5% 5</td>
<td>3% 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8%</td>
<td>Failure to Obey an Order or Regulation</td>
<td>9% 3</td>
<td>2% 2</td>
<td>11% 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7%</td>
<td>Counterproductive Leadership</td>
<td>7% 4</td>
<td>7% 2</td>
<td>6% 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Failure to Promote a Positive Command Climate</td>
<td>2% 3</td>
<td>7% 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Bullying</td>
<td>4% 3</td>
<td>3% 3</td>
<td>4% 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Extramarital Sexual Conduct</td>
<td>5% 5</td>
<td>7% 3</td>
<td>2% 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3%</td>
<td>False Statements or Writings / Failure to Disclose</td>
<td>5% 1</td>
<td>1% 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Failure to Take Appropriate Action</td>
<td>1% 2</td>
<td>2% 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Online Misconduct</td>
<td>5% 2</td>
<td>2% 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Restriction</td>
<td>3% 7</td>
<td>4% 4</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

*Sorted by ALL ARMY Investigated Allegation Percentages

### Figure 14

## NON-SENIOR OFFICIAL TOP SUBSTANTIATED COMMAND-REFERRED ALLEGATIONS FY21-23 BY COMPO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All ARMY % of Total</th>
<th>Top Substantiated Command Referred Allegations*</th>
<th>Active Duty</th>
<th>ARNG</th>
<th>USAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>Rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14%</td>
<td>Counterproductive Leadership</td>
<td>14% 1</td>
<td>9% 2</td>
<td>14% 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Failure to Treat Individuals with Dignity &amp; Respect</td>
<td>10% 3</td>
<td>6% 7</td>
<td>2% 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Extramarital Sexual Conduct</td>
<td>14% 2</td>
<td>5% 5</td>
<td>5% 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6%</td>
<td>Failure to Obey an Order or Regulation</td>
<td>7% 4</td>
<td>10% 1</td>
<td>3% 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Intimate</td>
<td>6% 8</td>
<td>3% 6</td>
<td>4% 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5%</td>
<td>Fraternization</td>
<td>6% 5</td>
<td>8% 5</td>
<td>3% 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Failure to Promote a Positive Command Climate</td>
<td>3% 4</td>
<td>4% 6</td>
<td>3% 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4%</td>
<td>Not Intimate</td>
<td>4% 2</td>
<td>2% 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Discipline</td>
<td>2% 8</td>
<td>4% 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3%</td>
<td>Bullying</td>
<td>3% 2</td>
<td>2% 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sorted by ALL ARMY Investigated Allegation Percentages

### Figure 15
Brigade Commander Misconduct Trends, FY23

In FY23, 695 allegations of misconduct were made against brigade commanders. Of the allegations, 387 were investigated by IGs, resulting in 18 substantiations. The other 308 were command-referred, resulting in 45 substantiations. The overall substantiation rate for FY23 was 9 percent, a 3.3 percent decrease from FY22. Figures 16, 17, and 18 show a breakdown of subtypes by percentage.
Battalion Commander Misconduct Trends, FY23

In FY23, 1,313 allegations of misconduct were made against battalion commanders. Of the allegations, 661 were investigated by IGs, resulting in 44 substantiations. The other 652 were command-referred, resulting in 102 substantiations. The overall substantiation rate for FY22 was 11.1 percent, a 3.5 percent decrease from FY22. Figures 19, 20, and 21 show a breakdown of subtypes by percentage.
Example: Substantiated Allegation Against a Battalion Commander

An IG received an anonymous complaint alleging that a battalion commander abused their authority by forcing unit members to purchase unit T-shirts at a fundraiser event. The funds from the T-shirt sales were intended to offset expenses incurred from a battalion-level military ball. Unit personnel perceived that the battalion commander improperly incentivized the sale of T-shirts during a unit function by offering informal awards, such as early dismissal on a duty day or time off. A command investigation determined the battalion commander did not offer informal time off awards as incentives for Soldiers to purchase the T-shirts. However, the investigation determined the commander failed to follow Army Regulation 1-10 (Fundraising in the Department of the Army), for not ensuring procedures were in place to safeguard and account for funds gained from the sale of the T-shirts. The investigation also determined that the commander failed to obtain proper approval to host the event and failed to ensure battalion-level Standard Operating Procedures were established.
Command Sergeants Major/Sergeants Major Misconduct, FY23

In FY23, 977 allegations of misconduct were made against command sergeants major and sergeants major. Of the allegations, 348 were investigated by IGs, resulting in 25 substantiations. The other 629 were command-referred, resulting in 129 substantiations. The overall substantiation rate for FY23 was 15.7 percent, a 1.5 percent increase from FY22. Figures 22, 23, and 24 show a breakdown of subtypes by percentage.
**Example: Substantiated Allegation Against a CSM**

An anonymous complainant alleged to an IG that their battalion command sergeant major was a ‘terrible’ leader who exhibited toxic leadership, and refused to allow NCOs to attend NCO professional development courses. The battalion's higher command appointed an investigating office to look into the allegations. Witness testimony indicated the command sergeant major had routinely harassed and bullied NCOs on the battalion staff and frequently singled out individual NCOs for daily public humiliation. As a result, several staff NCOs had sought counseling from the chaplain. Witness testimony and document reviews also indicated the command sergeant major had inappropriately prevented several staff NCOs from attending NCO profession development courses. The command sergeant major was substantiated for counterproductive leadership.

**Department of the Army Civilian Misconduct Trends, FY23**

In FY23, 1,934 allegations of misconduct were made against DA Civilians. Of the allegations, 714 were investigated by IGs, resulting in 117 substantiations. The other 1,220 were command-referred, resulting in 342 substantiations. The overall substantiation rate for FY23 was 23.7 percent, a 2.3 percent decrease from FY22. Figures 25, 26, and 27 show a breakdown of subtypes by percentage.
A senior NCO alleged to an IG that a Department of the Army Civilian director was trying to prevent subordinates from contacting IGs or Members of Congress. A whistleblower reprisal investigation was initiated and witness testimony indicated that during several organizational workshops the director made comments to the effect of, “You are wasting time having your Soldiers go to the IG or try to file a complaint... it takes away from people processing stuff,” “Do not contact a member of congress or file an IG complaint,” and “First allow my team or the chain of command address your issues prior to contacting the IG.” The investigating officer further determined that once the whistleblower reprisal investigation commenced, the director attempted to uncover the identity of the senior NCO complainant. The investigating officer determined that the comments made during the workshops were an attempt to restrict Soldiers within the organization from communicating with an IG or a Member of Congress in violation of Title 10, U.S.C. 1034 (Military Whistleblower Protection Act) and DODD 7050.06 (Military Whistleblower Protection). DODIG concurred with the substantiated finding of whistleblower reprisal.
FY23 Notable Events

Leadership Changes

BG James K. Dooghan assumed duties as Deputy, The Inspector General (DTIG), on July 17, 2023. BG Dooghan was previously the Deputy Commanding General for Maneuver with the 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado.

Mr. William E. Jenkins, Senior Executive Service, assumed duties as the Principal Deputy to The Inspector General for Inspections (PDTIG(I)) on July 5, 2023. Mr. Jenkins previously served as the Deputy Auditor General, Modernization, Acquisition & Sustainment Audits.

SGM Delia Quintero assumed duties as the 9th Inspector General Sergeant Major on June 12, 2023. SGM Quintero was previously the command sergeant major at the Cyber Center of Excellence and Fort Eisenhower (formerly Gordon), Georgia.

Brigade and Battalion Command Team and Staff Training Booklet

In March 2023, DAIG released the Brigade and Battalion Command Team and Staff Training Booklet. The booklet is designed for brigade and battalion commanders, sergeants major, and their staff members and seeks to assist these leaders in avoiding “gray area” misconduct that can result in an IG or other type of investigation.

Subjects covered include: whistleblower reprisal, involvement with Non-Federal Entities (NFE), social media, use of Government personnel and resources, command climate and failure to act, travel-related issues, perception of inappropriate relationships, and leave policies.

Each section includes an in-depth discussion on Army, DOD, and Federal standards of conduct, a situational vignette/example, discussion on the right steps to take, and references to relevant laws and regulations.

The booklet does not replace legal advice or ethics training; instead, it serves as a guideline to ensure brigade and battalion and their staff members are aware of common pitfalls that have resulted in investigations.

IGs throughout the Army are highly encouraged to have a PDF copy of the booklet in their files, and ensure their formation’s brigade and battalion command teams have a copy to use in their office.

The booklet is available for download at https://ig.army.mil/IG-SCHOOL-RESOURCES/Army-IG-Training-Materials-and-Reports/, or email the DAIG Analysis and Inspection Follow-up Office at usarmy.pentagon.hqda-otig.mbx.saig-ai-office@army.mil.
Worldwide Inspector General Conference

In late May, more than 140 members of the Army Inspector General community gathered at the National Guard Professional Education Center, Camp Robinson, Arkansas. The 2023 Worldwide Inspector General Conference was the first since 2019 to be conducted in person. Topics discussed included the IG Strategic Plan, the 2022 New Soldier Experience inspection, the tailorable inspection process, reporting prohibited activities, and command-referred allegations. The five Army Inspectors General of the Year were also honored at the conference.
Special Focus Areas

Organizational Inspection Program (OIP)

Overview of the OIP

The OIP allows commanders at all levels to see themselves and their units’ overall readiness objectively to make corrections where needed and to sustain areas of success. The updated AR 1-201 (Army Inspection Policy) describes the OIP and specifically requires commanders, program managers, and directors from the battalion level through ACOM, ASCC, and DRU levels, as well as State Adjutants General, to establish and maintain an effective OIP. The requirement for an OIP applies to organizations in all three Army components (active Army, ARNG, and USAR). Depending on the echelon and type of organization, the OIP will comprise command inspections, staff inspections, IG inspections (including intelligence oversight inspections), Staff Assistance Visits (SAVs), audits, certifications, external inspections, and any other applicable evaluations that help a commander measure and assess readiness.

Update to AR 1-201 (Army Inspection Policy)

In FY21, The U.S. Army Inspector General School at Fort Belvoir, VA, began a major revision of AR 1-201. This comprehensive revision was published Nov. 1, 2023. It includes the following summarized guidance:

- Added a requirement mandating that commanders designate the deputy commander, executive officer, or similar individual assigned as the second in command at the brigade level and below to serve as the organization’s organizational inspection program coordinator and for commanders above the brigade level to designate someone in a position of authority (such as a chief of staff or G–3) to serve as the organizational inspection program coordinator.
- Establishes a requirement for commanders, program managers, and directors to report the execution of all initial command inspections to the first commander in the chain of command with an assigned Army Inspector General
- Incorporates Army Directive 2023–15, which requires commanders to conduct subsequent command inspections of company-level units.
- Adds inspector general readiness assistance visits as an optional program that commanders with inspectors general may include in their organizational inspection programs.

IG role and Inspection Principles

IGs play a crucial role in the planning, management, and execution of the OIP. IGs don’t manage an organization’s OIP; however, they teach and train leaders and OIP coordinators about inspection policy and procedures and assist commanders in identifying systemic issues within the organization.

An effective OIP saves critical time by ensuring that inspections from both internal and external sources are not redundant and do not overlap. Inspections carried out under the OIP must follow the five principles of Army Inspections: Purposeful, Coordinated, Focused on Feedback, Instructive, and
Followed up.

**Command Inspections: Key to Success**

A crucial element of an OIP is ensuring commanders at the company/battery/troop level receive an Initial Command Inspection (ICI) soon after assuming command (within 90 days for AC units and 180 days for RC units not on active duty). The purpose of this inspection is to ensure that new commanders know their unit’s strengths and weaknesses as a way to establish realistic goals to improve unit readiness. The commander will be given ample time to focus on any issues identified as needing improvement. A Subsequent Command Inspection (SCI), required not later than one year after the ICI, will focus solely on such issues identified in the ICI to measure the commander’s progress in resolving them.

**OIP Resources**

Commanders, program managers, and directors of battalion-level and higher organizations should be familiar with The OIP Guide for Commanders, which can be downloaded at [https://ig.army.mil/IG-SCHOOL-RESOURCES/Regulations-Policies-and-Guides/](https://ig.army.mil/IG-SCHOOL-RESOURCES/Regulations-Policies-and-Guides/). This guide is an extension of AR 1-201 and provides direction on the practical aspects of developing, implementing, and managing an effective OIP.

**Ensuring Readiness Across the Army**

IGs throughout all Army components should engage their directing authorities on a regular basis to ensure that a viable, effective OIP is in place; that new commanders understand the requirements and purpose of the OIP; and that the organization’s leadership remains updated on the progress of the OIP.

**Inspector General Records Screening**

**Overview**

The Secretary of the Army is required to certify to DOD and Congress that officers nominated for appointment to a higher grade meet the standard of exemplary conduct in accordance with 10 USC 7233, Requirement of Exemplary Conduct.

Various statutes and policies also direct the Army to provide adverse information to promotion and command selection boards and during pre- and post-board screening, including:

- Army Directive (AD) 2016-26 (Screening Requirements for Adverse and Reportable Information for Promotion and Federal Recognition to Colonel and Below)
- DODI 1320.04 (Military Officer Actions Requiring Presidential, Secretary of Defense, or Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Approval or Senate Confirmation, Enclosure 4 (Adverse and Reportable Information)
- 10 USC 615 (Information furnished to selection boards)
- 10 USC 14107 (Information furnished by the Secretary concerned to promotion boards)
- 10 USC 628a & 10 USC 14502a (Special selection review boards)
Army regulations and policies also require that personnel undergo continuous screening and vetting prior to assignment to certain positions of leadership or trust. DAIG supports these requirements by conducting a thorough review of IG records to identify and report substantiated findings in response to requests from authorized Army agencies.

Only the DAIG’s Records Screening and Oversight Division (RSO) is authorized to conduct IG records screening—not local IG offices.

**Mandatory Records Screening**

DAIG participates in the personnel suitability screening process to provide Army leadership with situational awareness so that appropriate individuals are promoted or assigned to high-profile assignments, “positions of significant trust and authority,” or schools.

Those subjected to mandatory records screening include:
- General Officer/Senior Executive Service (brigadier general and above for promotion, assignment, and retirement)
- Promotion to Chief Warrant Officer 2 through Colonel
- Lieutenant Colonel or Colonel-level command selectees
- Sergeants Major Academy selectees
- Drill Sergeant and Recruiter selectees
- NGB Federal Recognition
- Sexual Assault Response Coordinators or Victim Advocate duty assignments
- IG position nominees (DA Civilians, Active Duty, ARNG, and USAR)
- Other “positions of special trust and authority” as designated by Army senior leaders

**Army Promotion Screening Process**

The promotion screening process involves multiple steps and entities. The diagrams below (Figures 28 and 29) demonstrate the steps of the pre-board and post-selection board screening process for promotion to First Lieutenant through Colonel and Chief Warrant Officer 2 through 5. This process was updated in AD 2016-26 (Screening Requirements for Adverse and Reportable Information for Promotion and Federal Recognition to Colonel and Below).

In January 2020, in response to the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 502, the Army G–1/Directorate of Manpower and Personnel Management (DMPM) revised the Army’s well-established promotion system to incorporate the new requirement to conduct pre-board screening to report adverse/reportable information to pre-/post-promotion boards. Post-board screening occurs before the results of a promotion selection board are forwarded to the Secretary of the Army. DAIG provides information to authorized requesters but has no 'vote' in deliberations or decisions.
In this process, DAIG receives a list of names to screen from an authorized requester (in this case, Army G–1). DAIG’s RSO Division checks each name against IG records to see if an individual has any substantiated IG allegation(s), or open or ongoing IG investigation(s). If the individual is not a subject of an ongoing case and does not have a substantiated IG allegation(s), DAIG’s RSO Division notifies the requester that the individual is cleared. However, if the individual has a substantiated allegation or an open or ongoing investigation, DAIG’s RSO Division will review the case file under AR 20-1.

If or when the case is closed, DAIG’s RSO Division will prepare and provide a synopsis of any substantiated allegation(s) to the authorized requester. They will also notify the requester that the
respective individual is cleared, if the findings substantiated against them are amended, or if their open or ongoing investigation closes either with no adverse information or IAW AR 20-1.

The Promotion Review Board (PRB) Process

The Army G–1, in coordination with screening organizations, requests and acts on adverse and reportable information presented as part of an eligible officer’s Promotion Board Screen. Screening organizations will conduct pre-/post-promotion boards screening of adverse and reportable information for all general officers and COL/O-6 and below. The Army G–1 will ensure all officers considered for promotion to GO and COL/O-6 and below are continuously screened for adverse and reportable information before and after selection boards. Additionally, the Army G–1 will acquire information from screening organizations that include Criminal Investigation Division (CID), DAIG, and the Office of The Judge Advocate General.

Promotion Screening Process Map. Multiple agencies provide detailed information to properly inform HRC on the suitability of an individual for promotion or other positions of significant trust. The promotion suitability process begins 215 days before the execution of the DA Board. The purple boxes at the top and bottom left depict DAIG’s role in this process (as a screening agency).

Statute and policy require Military Services to provide adverse and reportable data to promotion selection, special selection, and Federal recognition boards that consider officers for promotion to the grades of Reserves Army MAJ–COL and Reserve Component-COL. Adverse information that is not already part of the officer’s military personnel record (e.g., GOMOR and referred evaluations) will be provided to a board. When officers are notified that adverse information (substantiated DAIG findings and or CID/Law Enforcement reports) will be provided to promotion selection boards, they are afforded a reasonable opportunity to submit written comments.

To date, the top three reasons the Officer Review Board (ORB)/Special Selection Review Board (SSRB) recommends withholding an officer from a promotion list and sending him/her to a PRB are whistleblower reprisal, failure to treat Soldiers with dignity and respect, and inappropriate relationships. The ORB/SSRB, which convenes at HQDA, reviews any derogatory, adverse, or reportable information from RSO’s pre- and post-board screen, advises the Army G–1 or designee (normally the DMPM) whether the information is substantiated or relevant, and if it might reasonably and materially affect a promotion recommendation. If the ORB/SSRB clears an individual, the promotion process proceeds for that person. If the ORB/SSRB does not clear the individual, the PRB process is initiated.

Information Reported by DAIG in the Promotion Screening Process

If the DAIG’s RSO Division identifies that an individual has a substantiated adverse allegation in a closed IG case, DAIG will provide a synopsis of the case to Army G–1/GOMO. If DAIG’s RSO Division identifies an individual as the subject of an open case, DAIG’s RSO Division will report to Army G–1/GOMO there is an ongoing investigation and will continue to monitor the status of the IG case until it closes. Depending on the outcome of the case, DAIG’s RSO Division will report to Army G–1/GOMO the investigation cleared the individual, or DAIG’s RSO Division will provide a synopsis of any substantiated adverse findings. An individual’s promotion will not proceed until the investigation is closed, at which time the DAIG’s RSO Division reports any derogatory, adverse, or reportable information for adjudication by the appropriate authorities, as described above. Again, DAIG’s RSO
Division does not determine whether or not the individual is promoted.

# Acronyms and Initialisms

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACOM</td>
<td>Army Command</td>
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<td>AD</td>
<td>Army Directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Army Regulation</td>
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<td>ARNG</td>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
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<td>ARFORGEN</td>
<td>Army Force Generation</td>
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<td>ASCC</td>
<td>Army Service Component Command</td>
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<td>BAH</td>
<td>Basic Allowance for Housing</td>
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<td>CAC</td>
<td>Common Access Card</td>
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<td>CFR</td>
<td>Code of Federal Regulations</td>
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<td>CSA</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Army</td>
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<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
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<td>DAIG*</td>
<td>Department of the Army Inspector General (referring to the combined elements of OTIG and USAIGA as one entity)</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense Directive</td>
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<td>DODI</td>
<td>Department of Defense Instruction</td>
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<td>DODIG</td>
<td>Department of Defense Inspector General</td>
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<td>DRU</td>
<td>Direct Reporting Unit</td>
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<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal year</td>
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<td>IAW</td>
<td>In accordance with</td>
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<td>ICI</td>
<td>Initial command inspection</td>
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<td>IG</td>
<td>Inspector General</td>
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<td>NAF</td>
<td>Non-appropriated fund</td>
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<td>OHA</td>
<td>Overseas housing allowance</td>
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<td>OIP</td>
<td>Organizational Inspection Program</td>
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<td>OTIG</td>
<td>Office of The Inspector General</td>
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<td>RC</td>
<td>Reserve Component</td>
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<td>ROI</td>
<td>Report of investigation</td>
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<td>ROII</td>
<td>Report of investigative inquiry</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Secretary of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAIG*</td>
<td>Secretary of Army Inspector General (office symbol for the combined elements of OTIG and USAIGA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAV</td>
<td>Staff assistance visit</td>
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<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>Senior Executive Service</td>
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*The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 amended the Inspector General portion of the 1950 Army Reorganization Act by making TIG responsible to the SecArmy and responsive to the CSA. TIG’s other responsibilities remained the same, and the Agency’s office symbol changed from DAIG to SAIG [SecArmy IG]. Today we still use “DAIG” when referring to the combined elements of OTIG and USAIGA as one entity – even though the acronym could mislead in one respect: DAIG is no longer a part of the Army Staff but instead part of the SecArmy’s staff (the Secretariat). See the IG Reference Guide, March 2020, at page 1-18.*
Sciences Index:
SCI
Subsequent command inspection
TIG
The Inspector General
UCMJ
Uniform Code of Military Justice
USAIGA
U.S. Army Inspector General Agency

References

Except where indicated below, publications are available at https://armypubs.army.mil/.

IG training publications, including:
The Assistance and Investigations Guide;
The Inspections Guide;
The Inspector General Reference Guide;
The Intelligence Oversight Guide;
The Organizational Inspection Program Guide for Commanders; and
The Teaching and Training Guide
are available for download at https://ig.army.mil/IG-SCHOOL-RESOURCES/TIGS-Online/Digital-Library/#guides

United States Code is available at https://uscode.house.gov/

The Code of Federal Regulations is available at https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/ECFR?page=browse

DOD publications are available at https://www.esd.whs.mil/dd/


AR 1–201
Army Inspection Policy
AR 20–1
Inspector General Activities and Procedures
AR 600–20
Army Command Policy
DODI 6490.04
Mental Health Evaluations of Members of the Military Services
DODD 7050.06
Military Whistleblower Protection
5 USC 2302
Prohibited personnel practices
10 USC 1034
Protected communications; prohibition of retaliatory personnel actions
10 USC 1587
Employees of non-appropriated fund instrumentalities: reprisals
Terms

Adverse action
Any personnel action, administrative or judicial, that takes away an entitlement, results in an entry or document added to the affected person’s official personnel records that boards or superiors could consider negative, or permits the affected person to rebut or appeal the action. “Personnel action” includes actions defined in 5 USC 2302 and 10 USC 1587, as well as in DODD 7050.06. Adverse action includes “unfavorable information” as described in AR 600–37; action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice; or, with regard to DA Civilian employees, “disciplinary action” pursuant to applicable regulations, including AR 690–700 for appropriated fund employees and AR 215–3 for nonappropriated fund (NAF) employees. Other actions include a demotion; a transfer or reassignment; a performance evaluation; a decision on pay, benefits, awards, or training; referral for mental health evaluations under DODI 6490.04; and any other significant change in duties or responsibilities inconsistent with the military or civilian member’s rank or grade. A commander or supervisor desiring to take such action against an individual based on an IG document (except for DODIG-approved Army IG report of investigation (ROI) or report of investigative inquiry (ROII) containing substantiated allegations of violations of 10 USC 1034) requires TIG’s release of that document.

Allegation
A statement or assertion of wrongdoing by an individual, formulated by an IG. An allegation normally contains four essential elements: (1) who (named individual), (2) improperly, (3) did or failed to do something, (4) in violation of an established standard. The IG refines allegations based on evidence gathered during the course of an investigation. (Note: A single “investigation,” “inquiry,” “complaint,” or “case” may have multiple allegations associated with it. For the purpose of this report, we will not cite “case” statistics; rather, we focus on statistics regarding individual types of allegations.)

Command Inspector General
Each IG staff section assigned to a command, or any of the several States, contains a commissioned officer or Civilian who is designated as the command IG (only active Army commissioned officers may serve as State Command IGs). The Command IG leads the IG staff section and works directly for the commander or, in the case of the states, The Adjutant General. The Command IG communicates the commander’s vision, intent, philosophy, and guidance to the other members of the IG staff section, who in turn execute the four IG functions within the command or state based upon this guidance.

Command-referred allegation
Allegation(s) referred from the IG to the DA and subordinate commanders (at the behest of the DA) for command investigation/inquiry. DAs have the prerogative of initiating any type of investigation (or other appropriate action/inquiry) to address/resolve allegations or issues, and ensure the results are supported by credible evidence.

Complaint
An expression of dissatisfaction or discontent with a process or system or the specific behavior of an individual. Complaints often contain both issues and allegations.
Complainant  
A person who submits a complaint, allegation, or other request for assistance to an IG. The person can be a Soldier, Family member, member of another Service, Government employee, or member of the general public.

Compliance inspection  
An inspection focusing solely on a unit’s or organization’s compliance with a specified standard or series of standards. This inspection approach presumes the established standards are correct but does not preclude the inspector from determining the root causes of noncompliance—even if those root causes are matters that exceed the unit’s or organization’s ability to correct at the local level. General inspections are compliance.

Corrective Action  
Any action deemed necessary to rectify a violation or deficiency or to provide redress, to include changes in regulations or practices, administrative or disciplinary action against offending personnel, or referral to responsible officials or agencies for appropriate remedial action.

DAIG (Department of the Army Inspector General)  
The term DAIG is used when referring to both the Office of the Inspector General (OTIG) and the U.S. Army Inspector General Agency (USAIGA) as one entity. See AR 20-1, paragraph 1-9e. USAIGA’s operational and support divisions are always referred to as belonging to DAIG — for example, “DAIG’s Assistance Division (SAIG-AC).”

Directing authority (DA)  
An Army official who has authority to direct an IG investigation or inspection. At Headquarters, Department of the Army, the directing authorities are the SecArmy, the Under SecArmy, the CSA, the VCSA, and TIG. Commanders or directors who are authorized detailed IGs on their staffs may direct IG investigations and IG inspections within their commands. A DA may not delegate his or her authority, but may delegate, in writing, report-approval authority to a deputy commander or director. The SecArmy, the Under SecArmy, the CSA, the VCSA, and TIG may direct IG investigations and IG inspections within subordinate commands as necessary. Although command and state IGs may direct IG investigative inquiries, they are not considered directing authorities. When a rear detachment or rear unit commander is appointed in accordance with AR 220–5, that commander becomes a directing authority for the rear-area IG.

Directive  
A directive authorizes an IG investigation or IG inspection and represents the investigator’s authority to investigate specific allegations and the inspector’s authority to conduct an IG inspection.

Follow-Up Inspection  
The follow-up inspection may follow either a compliance or systemic inspection. Follow-up inspections look at the effectiveness of corrective actions taken since the last inspection occurred. This type of inspection is also an Army inspection principle often neglected by many commanders. This type of inspection closes the inspection loop and ensures the time and resources expended in an earlier inspection were put to good measure.

General inspection  
A comprehensive inspection focused on the overall economy, efficiency, discipline, morale, or
readiness aspects of a unit, organization, or activity. The objective of a general inspection is to produce a comprehensive picture of the unit’s status at that time, but commanders may limit the scope of the inspection to only a few areas. This type of inspection is compliance-oriented by nature (see the definition of a compliance inspection in Chapter II of this report).

**IG inspection**
An inspection focusing on the identification of problems, the determination of root causes, the development of possible solutions, and the assignment of responsibilities for correcting the problems. IGs normally conduct special inspections of systemic issues affecting a particular functional area such as logistics, personnel, maintenance, training, and so forth. The IG’s commander approves the scope and content of all IG inspections. Inspectors General generally do not perform compliance-oriented general inspections of units, organizations, and activities but instead defer those inspections to commanders in accordance with AR 1–201.

**IG inspections function**
The process of developing and implementing IG inspection programs, conducting IG inspections, and providing oversight of the organizational inspection program and intelligence activities.

**IG investigation**
A formal fact-finding examination into allegations, issues, or adverse conditions of a serious nature, in order to provide the directing authority a sound basis for making decisions and taking action. An IG investigation involves the systematic collection and examination of evidence consisting of testimony recorded under oath; documents; and, in some cases, physical evidence. Only the DA can authorize IG investigations using a written and signed directive. IGs normally do not resolve allegations using this methodology, but instead rely on the investigative inquiry. IGs report the conclusions of their investigations using an ROI. Occasionally, IG investigations may examine systemic issues, especially when the possibility of some wrongdoing exists. For example, an IG might investigate an allegation that the development of a weapon system is fraught with fraud, waste, and abuse.

**IG investigations function**
The process of receiving, examining, and responding to allegations and, in some cases, issues referred to an IG. The investigations function encompasses IG investigations and IG investigative inquiries.

**IG investigative inquiry**
An informal fact-finding examination into allegations, issues, or adverse conditions that are not significant in nature—as deemed by the command IG or DA—and when the potential for serious consequences (such as potential harm to a Soldier or negative impact on the Army’s image) are not foreseen.

The IGs’ investigative inquiries involve the collection and examination of evidence consisting of testimony or written statements, documents, and, in some cases, physical evidence. Command IGs direct investigative inquiries and provide recommendations to the DA or subordinate commanders as appropriate. The DA reserves the right to direct an investigative inquiry if he or she feels an investigation is not appropriate. Inspectors General resolve most allegations using this methodology and report their conclusions using a report of investigative inquiry (ROII).
IG system
The four Army IG functions—inspections, assistance, investigations, and teaching and training—as executed by all Army IGs, over whom TIG has policy oversight and certification authority. Inspectors General work for their respective commanders but must adhere to IG policy as established and promulgated by TIG.

IG technical channels
Relationship among all IGs throughout the Army. Connotes a confidential channel for passing IG information.

Initial Command Inspection (ICI)
ICIs are required for every new company-, troop-, battery-, or detachment-level commander. The initial command inspection for companies of all components—active, National Guard, and the Army Reserve—will occur within the first 90 days of assumption of command for the active component and 180 days for the reserve component (Army Regulation 1-201, paragraph 3-3 c). The ICI ensures that the commander understands the unit’s strengths and weaknesses. The inspected commander’s rater—the higher commander who hosted the ICI—should use the inspection results to help set goals for the new company-level Commander. Commanders cannot use the ICI results to evaluate the inspected commander or compare units. The inspected Commander is the only one who receives the results; however, the unit IG may request a copy of a generic, non-attributive set of the results to look for any patterns and trends. (See also: Subsequent Command Inspection (SCI))

Issue
A complaint, request for information, or request for assistance to the IG that does not list a specific individual as the violator of a standard or policy.

Office of the Inspector General (OTIG)
The secretariat-level IG staff office that coordinates IG activities on behalf of the Secretary of the Army. It includes TIG; DTIG; PDTIG(I); TIG sergeant major; an executive officer; executive assistants; and administrative support personnel. (See also DAIG and USAIGA.)

Organizational Inspection Program (OIP)
The commander’s/State Adjutant General’s/program manager’s/director’s program to manage all inspections (internal and external) conducted within the command. The overarching purpose of the OIP is to coordinate inspections and audits into a single, cohesive program focused on command objectives.

Report of investigation (ROI)
A written report used by IGs to address allegations, issues, or adverse conditions to provide the directing authority a sound basis for decisions. The directing authority approves the report of investigation.

Report of investigative inquiry (ROII)
A written report used by IGs to address allegations, issues, or adverse conditions to provide the directing authority, command, or state IG a sound basis for decisions. The DA, command IG, or state IG approves the ROII.
**Senior official**

Senior officials are defined as general officers (including ARNG, USAR, and retired general officers), promotable colonels, PUSMAs [Professors, U.S. Military Academy], SES Civilians, and special government employees (scientific or professional, senior level, defense intelligence senior level [DISL], and highly qualified experts [HQE]). A National Guard colonel becomes a senior official when the officer is submitted to compete on a GOFRB [General Officer Federal Recognition Board] for a COE [Certificate of Eligibility] and remains a senior official until completion of the GOFRB process. Colonels selected by the GOFRB, confirmed by the Senate for a COE, and assigned to a general officer billet are considered senior officials. Colonels who receive a COE but are not assigned to a general officer billet are not considered senior officials until they are assigned to, or nominated for, a general officer billet.

**Subsequent Command Inspection (SCI)**

Subsequent command inspections (SCIs) measure progress and reinforce the goals and standards established during the ICIs conducted for new company commanders (or leaders of a similarly-sized organization). These inspections are often focused inspections that look at specific areas and are not complete re-inspections of the entire unit. Commanders in both operating and generating force organizations of all components—Regular Army and Reserve Component—will conduct SCIs after allowing inspected commanders sufficient time to make corrections, usually not later than one year after completion of the new commander’s ICI in the Regular Army and at a date determined by the commander in the Reserve Component (USAR and ARNGUS). The one-year guideline applies to Reserve Component units mobilized on active duty. The first general officer in the chain of command may waive the requirement to conduct an SCI.